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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM STRATEGIES 
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Edward Warrington 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper reviews features which are associated with small scale and 
with [relative] geographical isolation in Malta's administrative reform initiated in 
May 1988. It identifies the issues associated with these twin phenomena, and outlines 
the strategies proposed for dealing with them. It concludes by posing questions 
regarding, firstly, the appropriateness of the strategies proposed and, secondly, the 
extent to which the lessons of Malta's experience are applicable to other small and 
island states. 
The author writes from the perspective of his former position as Secretary of 
the Public Service Reform Commission, which played a principal role in formulating 
the strategies for administrative reform. 1 
The reader who is unfamiliar with Malta's system of government and 
administration may find Appendix I useful. 
BACKGROUND 
Before reviewing the issues and strategies addressed in the reform 
programme, it is necessary to outline the factors which generated and shaped 
the agenda for reform, and the events which precipitated it. 
Among these factors, three are significant: firstly, the social relationships 
associated with a small, insular SOCiety; secondly, post-war economic and social 
developments; and thirdly, the administrative tradition of the Island. 
Malta displays many of the characteristics commonly attributed to small 
societies: it is distinct and homogeneous, in close proximity to foreign cultural 
influences; 'face-to-face' relations characterise social interaction; the concern 
for status and image, and the need to safeguard personal privacy promote 
secretiveness; disputes tend to be strident, personal and long-standing.2 
Politics is characterised by intense partisanship, by the conflation of 
national and local issues, and by a style of leadership that has elements of 
both charisma and patronage. The electoral system, with its low thresholds, 
multiparty constituencies and fine voting margins, accentuates the ordinary 
pressures to operate through networks and to circumscribe formal institutions. 
The impact on public administration is immediate and pervasive. 
Public administration has also been significantly affected by economic and 
social developments in the years since 1947, including industrialisation and 
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the creation of an elaborate social welfare system. Besides creating complex 
new tasks for the administrative services, they accentuated a tradition of 
governmental intervention in the economic life of the Island that was the result 
of Malta's historic role as a fortress colony and the attendant insecurity and/or 
seasonality of much employment in the armed services, the naval dockyard 
and the private sector. 
In fact, Malta's administrative history is probably unique among small and 
island states for its extent and its complexity. The year 1530 marks a 
watershed: the establishment in the Island of the crusading Order of st. John 
of Jerusalem cast Malta in a fortress role and, more importantly, perhaps, 
introduced the administrative apparatus of a de facto sovereign state. During 
the intervening centuries until the establishment of self-government in 1921, 
public administration became progressively more centralised and more 
interventionist. Though staffed by the emerging Maltese middle class, its 
activities were more closely associated with the presence of the colonial power 
than with the needs and aspirations of the local population. 3 
The fact that the public service served as an instrument of colonial rule, 
and the uneven political transition to full national independence, may be the 
principal reasons for ambiguities in the relations between civil servants and 
Maltese politicians. Though the Independence Constitution included a chapter 
on the public service, and established the Westminster/Whitehall system of 
government and administration, it did not address basic issues such as the 
delineation of political and administrative roles, or patterns of authority and 
organisation, or ethics in government. 4 
The events that precipitated the review beginning in 1988 arose from an 
extended political and constitutional crisis during the first half of the eighties, 
a period which saw the legitimacy of governmental institutions eroded, as a 
result of the political strategies of both government and opposition: the 
considerable powers of administrative discretion were applied by Government 
in an effort to break Opposition boycotts and protests. 
The government which took office in 1987 after three terms in opposition, 
declared it& commitment to institutional reform involving every branch of the 
state. It spoke of eradicating the abuse of administrative discretion (whether 
for 'reasons of state' or for patronage); promoting just, equitable administration; 
and improving administrative efficiency. 5 
In addition, major goals of the government's programme had important 
implications for the public service: these included the reorientation of welfare 
provision (away from welfare payments and institutional care); the 
reorientation of the economy towards services; and the commitment to seek 
membership in the European Community. 6 
This brief statement is not an exhaustive analysis of the factors affecting 
Maltese public administration: it merely points to their multiplicity, complexity 
and interrelatedness. The impact and effects of Malta's small size and 
geographic isolation are not easily dissociated from other factors: therefore, 
it would be expected that a strategy for administrative reform would not merely 
address one factor or set of factors. 
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INITIATING REFORM - TERMS OF REFERENCE 
, In fact, the terms of reference of the two exercises which were 
commissioned in 1988 to propose strategies for change would not appear to 
be markedly different from other administrative reforms initiated during the 
1980's when public administrative services came under close security in many 
parts of the world. 
The Public Service Reform Commission was appointed in May 1988 'to 
examine the organisation of the public service and to recommend means by 
which the Service can effiCiently respond to the changing needs for effective 
government. '7 
Soon after, an expatriate Maltese consultant began an 'Operations Review' 
intended to evaluate existing organisation structures in the light of the 
government's objectives, to recommend appropriate delineations, 
organisational structures and mandates; and to develop a suitable information 
technology plan identifying needs, opportunities and cost-benefits for the 
application of computer technology.s 
The two initiatives worked in concert, producing first reports in January 
1989. The Reform Commission's principal report was submitted in July 1989, 
and its work ended with the presentation of a final report in February 1990. 
The Operations Review came to an end in June 1990 with the submission of 
an Information Systems Strategic Plan. 
The effects of small scale were taken into particular account in 
recommendations relating to three sets of issues - administrative legitimacy, 
the scale and commitments of government, and the availability of skills and 
expertise. They are briefly reviewed here. 
RESTORING ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY 
The Reform Commission's first stage report speaks of H •••• the themes, 
goals and strategies of reform: good management, customer sensitivity, 
efficiency, leadership, accountability and protection of the rights of employees." 
The statement illustrates the Commission's concern about administrative 
legitimacy. In fact, no less than four of the eleven goals of reform are directly 
concerned with restoring administrative legitimacy: Goal One: Win public 
confidence in the Service; Goal Two: Create a culture of excellence and 
integrity; Goal Nine: Increase planning and audit capabilities; and Goal Ten: 
Define and contain Executive discretion. 9 
EVidently, administrative legitimacy is seen as critical for establishing a 
ciimate of trust that is, in turn, a pre-requisite for good government and for 
successful reform.l° The conditions peculiar to Malta in the 1980's - the 
sharply-diVided electorate, the legacy of bitter disputes, and instances of human 
rights violations - make the task all the more difficult: the average citizen 
has come to view governmental decisions with which he disagrees as 'unjust' 
and meriting redress - judicial or otherwise. The number of cases presented 
before the Commission for the Investigation of Injustices (also appOinted in 
1988) is indicative of the prevailing mood. 11 
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In order to win public confidence in the Service, the Commission proposed, 
firstly, improved customer relations; secondly, effective action to deal with 
patronage, corruption and incompetence; and thirdly, on a more positive note, 
the progressive development of open government. 
This is not the place to review the detailed proposals. The principal 
recommendations include: a communications strategy for keeping the public 
generally, and specific customer groups in particular, informed of matters that 
concern them as customers of the public service; improved procedures for 
conducting public inquiries, especially, mechanisms to 'trigger' investigations 
and mandatory tabling of reports in Parliament; and legislation to regulate 
access to and use of official information.l 2 
Goal Two - Create a culture of excellence and integrity - concerns the 
administrative culture of the public service. This influences the exercise of 
administrative discretion which is, in turn, both liable to manipulation by 
networks, and prone to rouse suspicion. The Commission enunciated two 
important principles: a single standard of conduct in public life; and a 
distinction between offences against professional ethics, and offences against 
discipline. 
In the Commission's view: 
" .... public seIVice ethics find their context in the broader questions of conduct 
in public life. Specifically, the public seIVice is a political institution: as part 
of the framework of government, it participates in the political process by 
which decisions are taken on behalf of the national community. Therefore, 
there cannot be two standards of conduct, one for civil seIVants and one for 
politicians. " 
A national dialogue on public service ethics is therefore proposed, 
with a view to developing conflict of interest guidelines applying to all 
public offiCials, including politicians, their private staff and confidential 
advisers. 13 
Administrative discretion, exercised within the framework of law and 
subject to the overriding authority of a minister, is distinguished from 
professional judgements, made by virtue of professional training and standards 
(legal, medical, accounting, engineering). The Commission recommended a 
measure of protection for civil servants who resist interference with their 
professional judgement, by seperating jurisdiction over diSciplinary offences 
from offences against professional conduct, and placing the latter in the hands 
of an autonomous Public Service Disciplinary Board.l4 A hypothetical 
example of one instance in which such protection may be necessary, would 
be action taken against an engineer for refusing for professional reasons to 
certify the soundness of works carried out by a contractor who is related to 
the minister of works. 
In the same vein, the Commission proposed that the exercise of discretion 
should be regulated by clear objectives, procedures and criteria, which would 
also provide the basis for independent scrutiny of decisions and actions. 
Furthermore, other recommendations under Goal Nine - Increase planning 
and audit capabilities - focus on organisational and resource constraints that 
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limit the effectiveness of the Director of Audit and the Public Service 
Commission as independent scrutineers of governmental action. (Goal Ten 
extends the same principles to the management of human resources within 
the public service.) 
THE SCALE AND COMMITMENTS OF GOVERNMENT 
A study carried out by the Commission illustrated the growth of Malta's 
public administration in terms of both scale and complexity.l5 No judgement 
was made as to whether the current scale and commitments are beyond the 
capacity of the country to retain or, indeed, whether the current scale of 
government is consistent with the real needs of the country. Perhaps a sentence 
in the opening statement of findings sums up the situation well, if rather 
intemperately: "[ the public service 1 attempts unavailingly to reconcile 
unlimited demand for services with finite resources and limited delivery 
systems."16 
The Operations Review identified the dysfunctions caused by scale and 
complexity. It proposed a new pattern for organising the business of 
government in ministerial portfolios, as well as organisational structures to 
deal with interdependencies or with emerging policy sectors that are rapidly 
assuming importance. The recommendations have not been made public: 
however, a Cabinet reshuffle in May 1990 may well have taken account of 
the consultant's recommendations. 17 
The major public statement about the implications of growing 
governmental scale and complexity for public adiministration is found in 
Chapter 5 of the Commission's first stage report. The Commission identified 
the major tasks devolving on the public service in the light of the present scale 
of national development and Government's declared objectives. It then 
proceeded to outline the demands that these tasks would make on the public 
service, in terms of its capacity for policy analysis, planning, regulation and 
service delivery. It concluded that the Maltese public service could not meet 
&11 these demands from its present resources, but assumed that, for the coming 
few years, the public service would be alone among Maltese organisations 
in being able to muster resources that could cope with the scale of government 
operations. 18 The Commission therefore proposed Goal Three: Define the 
role of the public service. 
In brief, this means that the activity, resources and development effort 
of the public service (which is a career service) should be focused on the areas 
of its greatest strength, ie, administration of legislation and service delivery.19 
Tasks such as policy analysis and planning, which must be completed within 
short time-frames, and which are carried out by multi-disciplinary teams of 
specialists who could not be produced by the career service (except, perhaps, 
at unacceptable cost) would be acquired outside the public service, but grafted 
onto the organisational fabric of the Service.20 Departments of the public 
service would be structured so as to carry out the full range of tasks, but 
not all positions (particularly those requiring specialists) would be filled 
permanently. 
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STAFFING THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
This raises another significant handicap confronting administration in 
small and island states - staffing. In any jurisdiction, the career system 
traditionally operated by civil services is unable to attract and retain the full 
range of specialists - some of them having a high scarcity value - required 
to staff departments. A limited population, inadequate educational systems 
and low wage rates compound these difficulties, as does the growth of the 
private sector, which competes for talent. 
The traditional solution is to acquire specialist expertise outside the 
country, on the open market, if the country can afford it, otherwise, through 
technical assistance programmes. While this may produce results in terms 
of small numbers of technical specialists, it would almost certainly not be a 
viable option if managerial expertise is required throughout the public service. 
Given the complexity of government's tasks and the scale of budgetary, 
technological and human resources allocated for those tasks, managerial talent 
of a high order and in large amounts is precisely what is required. Again, in 
the short term, at least, the career system is found wanting. 
The Commission therefore proposed that the Maltese public service should 
modify the career system by competing at the highest levels for managerial 
talent. 21 It recommended, firstly, a top management category (Category A) 
to which entry from the more junior ranks of the career civil service would 
be regulated by the principle of competition; secondly, external recruitment 
to fill positions for which no suitable career candidates are found; and, thirdly, 
negotiable benefits packages, to allow the Service to compete with the private 
sector in the labour market. 22 
STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING ISSUES OF SMALL SCALE: 
APPROPRIATENESS, COSTS AND RISKS 
Many of the issues raised before the Public Service Reform Commission 
are characteristic of diverse administrative systems. The Commission's reports 
do not contain explicit references to Malta's small scale and, still less, to its 
geographic isolation. Was this dimension given the importance it warranted? 
A brief answer to this question would be that the Commission regarded small 
scale as a factor contributing to the general malaise of the public service, 
accentuating problems such as the poor delineation of roles, rather than the 
sole or the primary cause of particular dysfunctions. The precise effects and 
implications of small scale were not dwelt upon, because they are not easily 
disentangled from the other significant factors. 
Were the effects of small scale addressed adequately, and were the 
strategies appropriate? Let us first consider the impact and implications of 
the Commission's recommendations in regard to the issues reviewed earlier. 
The targets of the recommendations on administrative legitimacy and 
administrative culture are the networks of kinship and patronage, and the 
objectives are two-fold: firstly, to reduce the utility of networks to those who 
manipute them, by redUCing the public's ignorance of its rights and obligations, 
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as well as the intimidating bureacracy, all of which are powerful inducements 
to transact business 'informally'; and, secondly, to break the vicious circle of 
official secrecy and unofficial rumuor, which is characteristic of closed 
societies, while containing the potentially scandalous disclosure of official 
information and protecting the privacy of individuals.22 The Commission's 
recommendations are forceful, but clearly consistent with democratic 
principles. More importantly, they are also consistent with values in Maltese 
society which, though recognised as significant, have either been devalued 
or distorted. The Commission's recommendations serve to identify values such 
as justice, fair play, equity and the rights of individuals more closely with the 
formal institutions of government, than with informal social processes. 
Genuinely independent scrutiny of administrative processes is perhaps 
the most evasive goal in small states. Members of supposedly independent 
boards and commissions are appointed by governments acting almost 
exclusively in their discretion. In Malta, it is widely acknowledged that persons 
who are broadly sympathetic to the policies of the incumbent administration 
are so appointed. While this is probably true of other countries with democratic 
credentials, in Malta's sharply partisan society, the average citizen finds it 
especially difficult to acknowledge the integrity of members of a board or 
commission - and, by implication, the legitimacy of the board's decisions -
if they are identified with either of the two major political camps: a citizen 
belonging to the party in opposition regards board members as servants of 
government's political interests; while a citizen belonging to the party in 
government assumes that board members will extend their patronage to 
supporters of the government. It is not actual corruption so much as the 
prevailing attitudes that compromise the position of independent referees or 
scrutineers. 
In the same vein, the public questions the integrity of members of the 
Public Service Commission (on whose recommendations the government must 
act in filling most positions in the public service). In addressing this vitally 
important matter, the Reform Commission did not go so far as to propose that 
members of the PSC should be appointed for a reasonable, definite period 
(though it did so in the case of a Senior Appointments Selection Committee, 
which is referred to again later in this paper).24 Nor did the Commission 
propose criteria for the choice of members of the PSC, an equally important 
matter, perhaps because in so doing it would, by implication, cast doubts upon 
the integrity of the members of the present Commission. It remains to be seen 
whether guarateed tenure, operational autonomy and enhanced capacity for 
initiating scrutinies of public service appointments will be sufficient to give 
credibility to the Public Service Commission as an independent 'watchdog'. 
The need for independent scrutiny of Executive action will be all the greater 
if the Reform Commission's recommendations on external appointments to 
top management postions in the public service are implemented. Already the 
cry has gone up that this will be a device to politicize the highest ranks of 
what should be a neutral Service.25 The Commission itself was conscious of 
this risk, and recommended several measures to bring a degree of transparency 
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to the appointment procedures, among them a Senior Appointments Selection 
Committee which would carry out a search for candidates, vet applicants and 
propose names for the Prime Minister and the Public Service Commission to 
consider.26 The implementation of these recommendations requires a 
constitutional amendment and would almost certainly be very contentious. 
Even if the political difficulties are set aside, the matter of allowing 
competition for scarce managerial talent is not a straightforward solution to 
the problem of staffing the public service in a small country. It may actually 
impose an additional burden on the private sector in the form of greater costs 
in securing and retaining managerial personnel. In a small state, there is an 
especially fine trade-off betweenn promoting excellence in public 
administration - which is generally acknowledged as essential in developing 
countries - and competing for scarce resources with private enterprise which 
may be struggling under government-imposed burdens and handicaps. In the 
longer term, the constraints may be eased if the competition for talent actually 
prompts investment in human capital through education. 
The Maltese government has also resorted to another strategem for dealing 
with the issue - it is actively searching for talent and expertise among the 
large expatriate Maltese communities in Australia, the United States and 
Canada. The results of this search have been encouraging. 
The appropriateness of recommendations relating to the scale and 
commitments of government is less easily evaluated. Certainly, strains in the 
organisational fabric of public administration are caused by the excessive 
demands placed on limited capacity, but whether or not the plans, programmes 
and initiatives are essential to Malta's development is a question to which a 
simple answer risks being simplistic. The cynical observer and the harried 
administrator may regard the country's infrastructural and social-welfare 
programmes as unsustainable, and its foreign policy initiatives (the Law of 
the Sea, the Mediterranean dimension in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the climate as the common heritage of mankind, and 
full membership of the European Community) as pretentious. On the other 
hand, assuming the perspectives, goals and burdens of a full-sized power may 
be the only way for a lilliputian state to break out of the handicaps imposed 
by its size in a world of large powers. This is one feature of the 'coping' 
strategies of small states which deserves further study. 
EXTENDING TIlE APPLICABILITY OF MALTA'S EXPERIENCE 
This point leads to the final question of this paper: to what extent are the 
strategies attempted in Malta for dealing with small scale relevant to other 
small and island states? 
In attempting to answer this question it is necessary to bear in mind, firstly, 
the great diversity within the category 'small and island state' and, secondly 
the fact that in a league table of such territories, Malta assumes the dimensions 
of a superpower!27 Its economy is reasonably diversified; the private sector 
accounts for more than half of the gross domestic product; the educational 
system caters for a range of diSCiplines and is able to meet diverse manpower 
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needs. Malta's relatively strong economic position allows it to consider 
solutions that would not be feasible in other small and island state. For 
example, it can afford to recruit management expertise on the international 
market and has done so in order to establish a Management Systems Unit 
that will support the implementation of the administrative changes that are 
proposed. It should therefore be borne in mind that it may be just as perilous 
to transpose solutions from one small state to another as it is to transpose 
solutions from a developed to a developing state. 
Rather than applying particular recommendations of Malta's Public Service 
Reform Commission to other small and island states, it may be more useful 
to adopt some of the principles and premises upon which the Commission's 
proposals were based. 
The most important of these was the Commission's premise that its 
proposals should all be realisable within the constraints imposed by local 
politics and resource availability if they were to stand any chance of 
implementation.28 The principle has two applications. 
The first, most obvious application relates to the financial costs of reform: 
the cost of skills, expertise, technology, new organisations and operating 
systems required for implementation. Not only is it necessary to assess the 
relative costs and benefits of alternative reform strategies; it is equally 
important to evaluate whether they are affordable; the limit of what is affordable 
may be tighter in a small state. 
The second application of the principle relates to what is politically feasible 
given prevailing .social and political values. To a greater or lesser extent, 
change is threatening to particular stake-holders; the challenge for the reformer 
lies in minimising the threat for all stake-holders while maximising change. 
Malta's Reform Commission applied this to the goal of promoting 
administrative legitimacy: it sought to create an institutional framework that 
helps to identify commonly-held values more closely with the formal process 
of government that with the informal processes. It did not attempt to eradicate 
informal processes, a goal that may, in any case, be unattainable. The 
Commission also recognised that it is ultimately attitudinal rather than 
organisational changes which underpin the effort at reform. The proposals 
intended for addressing the problem of administrative legitimacy may be 
especially applicable to other small and island states. 
Though self-evident, the principles which guided the Commission may be 
neglected by the drafters of reform, especially if external consultants who are 
not entirely familiar with the political and administrative culture, and 
insufficiently appreciative of the capacity of local resources, are engaged to 
advise on administrative reform. Poor and insecure as they often are, small 
and island states may give in to the Siren-song of glittering technology and 
gilded expertise, with its promise of administrative efficiency and effectiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper is merely a first, partial attempt at evaluating the 
appropriateness of administrative reforms initiated in a small-state setting. 
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The most important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing pages is the 
difficulty associated with attempting to disaggregate the impact and effects 
of small scale and geographical isolation, given the complexity and inter-
relatedness of issues affecting the performance of public administration. Given 
this caveat, however, the paper has argued for the soundness of the principles 
applied by the Public Service Reform Commission in Malta. 
Edward Warrington is lecturer in the Department of Public PoliCy, University of Malta. 
APPENDIX I 
A Note on Malta's System of Government and Administration 
1. BASIC DATA ON MALTA 
Territory: Three inhabited islands in the central Mediterranean; area c. 120 
square miles 
Population: c. 345,000 
GNP at factor cost (1988): Lm542.6 million (Source: Economic Survey 1989). 
Government budget (1990): Expenditure Lm391.4 million; Local revenue 
Lm323.8 million. (Source: Financial Estimates 1990). 
Major economic sectors: light manufacturing, tourism, ship-repair. 
2. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS 
Form: Republican, with parliamentary executive 
Legislature: unicameral House of Representatives (presently 69 members) 
elected by direct, universal suffrage at five-yearly intervals. 
Executive: Cabinet of ministers; currently comprises ten portfolios 
Prime Minister 
Foreign Affairs and justice 
Education and Interior 
Social Policy 
Finance 
Development of Infrastructure 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
Tertiary Sector 
Gozo 
Economic Affairs 
Nine parliamentary Secretaries (junior ministers) supervise policy 
sectors within four portfolios. 
judiciary: Bench of judges appointed by the President acting on 
recommendation of the Prime Minister; judges are not removable 
from office except on a motion supported by not less than two-
thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. 
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3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Major legislative codes: Constitution of the Republic of Malta - Chapter X -
The Public Service; Interpretation Act, 1975; 
Ministers (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1988; Official 
Secrets Ordinance; Pensions Ordinance; Financial 
Administration and Audit Act, 1962; 
The Prime Minister is Minister for the Public Service and Chairman of 
a newly-appointed Cabinet Committee for Public Service Reform. 
Basic organisational forms: departments and divisions, but the Sixty-odd 
organisations that make up the public service 
carry a variety of labels (ministry, parliamentary 
secretariat, department, division, unit, office) 
which do not necessarily relate to particular 
organisational forms. 
Scope of activity: there is no local government in Malta; the public service 
carries out tasks of both national and local administration; 
municipal services and regulatory activities are increasingly 
being transferred to statutory corporations. 
Leadership: (a) the Administrative Secretary who is the chief secretary to 
government is also recognised as Head of the Public Service; 
(b) Permanent Secretaries: appOinted by the President acting on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister (this section of the 
Constitution is inoperative); 
(c) Heads of Department: appOinted by the Prime Minister from 
among senior public officers folloWing consultations with the 
Public Service Commission. 
AppOintments, discipline and removal from office: made by the Prime 
Minister acting on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission in 
the case of all officers other than those listed above. 
Manpower: c. 27,000 regular public officers; c. 8,000 auxiliaries; (c. 10,000 
in statutory corporations and large public enterprises) 
Notes 
1. The documents quoted here are all published reports and papers of the Public 
Service R':lform Commission. These include: 
A New Public Service for Malta: A Report on the Organisation of the Public Service, 
July 1989 (cited here as First-stage report) 
A New Public Service for Malta: Further Proposals on Administrative Structures, 
Grading, Staff Development, Selection and Compensation, February 1990 (cited 
here as Second-stage report) 
A New Public Service for Malta: Supplementary Papers, January 1990 (c;:ited here 
as Papers) 
The reports of the Operations Review have restricted circulation; the only 
references to the Review that are made in this paper are taken from statements 
made in public or in the press. 
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2. Kaminarides,J., Briguglio, L., Hoogendonk, H.N.,: The Economic Development of 
Small Countries - Problems, Strategies and Policies (Delft, the Netherlands: 
Eburon, 1989) is a very useful introduction to issues relating to small and island 
states. The paper by Jake JACOBS on "The Economic Development of Small 
Countries: Some Reflections of a Non-Economist" (in the same volume) presents 
nineteen factors affecting administration in such states. 
Jeremy Boissevain: Hal-Farrug - A Village in Malta (New York: Holt, Reinhart & 
Winston, 1968) and Saints and Fireworks - Religion and Politics in Rural Malta 
(London School of Economics monographs on Social Anthropology No 30, London, 
Athlone Press, 1965) presents an excellent account of social relationships in Malta. 
3. In the absence of a study on the development of the Maltese administrative services, 
these statements should be taken as hypotheses. 
4. Chapter X of both the Independence and the Republican Constitutions dealt with 
the public service: Sec 109 - the Public Service Commission; Sec 11 0 -
AppOintment, discipline and removal of public officers; Sec 111 - Principal 
representatives of Malta abroad; Sec 112 - AppOintment on transfer in respect 
of certain offices; Sec 113 - Protection of pension rights; Sec 114 - Grant and 
withholding of pensions, etc; Sec 115 - Protection of Public Service Commission 
from legal proceedings. 
Constitution of the Republic of Malta, Department of Information, Valletta, 1975. 
5. Partit Nazzjonalista: Xoghol Gustizzja, Liberta - Is-sisien ghall-Geijieni (Electoral 
Programme) Sections Ill.2 and Ill.9 (Malta: Stamperija Indipendenza, 1987) 
6. ibid: Sections IIL6 and Ill.8 
7. Public Service Reform Commission: First Stage Report Appendix I 
8. The Sunday Times (Malta) July 22, 1990: "The Great Reformation" - Interview 
with J V TABONE, Operations Review Consultant 
9. The first stage report of the PRSC enunciates eleven goals for reform: 
Goal One: Win public confidence in the Service 
Goal Two: Create a Culture of excellence and integrity 
Goal Three: Define the role of the public service 
Goal Four: Develop administrative structures and management systems 
Goal Five: Define and develop employee competence 
Goal Six: Select and retain the brightest and ablest 
Goal Seven: Improve the quality of management 
Goal Eight: Invest in technology and plant 
Goal Nine: Increase planning and audit capabilities 
Goal Ten: Define and contain executive discretion 
Goal Eleven: Institutionalise change 
10. PSRC: First Stage Report p (iii) 
11. The figure currently stands at 4. See reply to Parliamentary Question No. 
12. PSRC: First Stage Report pp 10- 13 
13. Ibid.: pp 14, 15 
14. Ibid.: p 16 
15. PSRC: Papers: "Supplementary Paper No 2 - The Growth of the Public Service: 
16. PSRC: First Stage Report p 1 
17. For the organisational issues addressed by the Operations Review see The Sunday 
Times, op cit. 
18. PSRC: First Stage Report Chapter 5 
19. PSRC: First Stage Report p 21 
20. Ibid.: p 22 
21. PSRC: First Stage Report p 56 
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22. PRSC: First Stage Report pp 57, 58; see also PSRC: Second Stage Report pp 70-73 
23. PSRC: First Stage Report p 12 
24. PSRC: Second Stage Report p66 
25. See correspondence in The Sunday Times April 1990 
26 PSRC: First Stage Report p 57 and PSRC: Second Stage Report pp 65-67 
27 See DOUMENGE F: "Basic Criteria for Estimating the Viability of Small Island 
States" in KAMINARIDES et aI, op cit. 
28. This is not explicitly stated in the reports, but it was adopted very early in the 
Commission's deliberations and is evident throughout the reports in matters such 
as the consistent preference for upgrading existing institutions (Public Service 
Commission, Department of Audit, Management & Personnel Office), rather thaL 
the creation of new ones. 
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